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Domestic Relations
By Joseph E. Cheeley, Jr.* and Joseph E. Cheeley, III**
The law of domestic relations is an attempt to manage the lives of numerous, divergent family members who more than likely differ in their
familial values. Much of this body of law is the result of history, but today the marital relationship seems to be changing in a revolutionary manner. In Georgia in 1978 there was approximately 1 divorce for every 2.16
marriages.'
This survey of domestic relations law covers cases from 149 Ga. App.
595 to 153 Ga. App. 742, and from 243 Ga. 436 to 245 Ga. 628. However,
only the most noteworthy are discussed here, and for analytical purposes
they have been categorized as follows: divorce, alimony, custody and
adoption. A section on legislation concludes the article.
I.

DIVORCE

What is an uncontested divorce? In Hardwick v. Hardwick,2 the supreme court answered this question by ruling that an uncontested divorce
is by definition a divorce granted when a defendant fails to file defensive
pleadings. Furthermore, the failure to file defensive pleadings constitutes
a waiver of notice of the hearing on the final decree under Georgia Code
Ann. section 81A-105(a).3
Several cases have presented the issue as to whether a judgment of a
foreign jurisdiction was entitled to full faith and credit in Georgia. Perhaps the most noteworthy of these cases is Cannon v. Cannon,4 wherein
the supreme court held that the foreign judgment was entitled to full
* Senior partner in the firm of Cheeley & Chandler, Buford, Georgia. University of
Georgia (J.D., 1950). Member of the State Bar of Georgia. Judge, State Court of Gwinnett
County, 1958-1978.
** Associate in the firm of Cheeley & Chandler, Buford, Georgia. University of Georgia
(A.B., 1976; J.D., 1980). Member of the State Bar of Georgia.
1. Total number of 1978 Georgia marriages and divorces was 68,171 and 31,554, respectively. Source: State of Georgia Dept. of Vital Records.
2. 245 Ga. 570, 266 S.E.2d 184 (1980).
3. GA. CODE ANN. § 81A-105(a) (1977).
4. 244 Ga. 299, 260 S.E.2d 19 (1979).
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faith and credit, notwithstanding the fact that a provision in the marriage
settlement agreement contained a provision not to contest a later divorce.
Although such a provision is void as against the public policy of Georgia,5
the court held that the foreign judgment was nevertheless entitled to full
faith and credit, since "local policy considerations must give way to this
constitutional provision."
II.
A.

ALIMONY

The Obligation

Georgia's recently amended alimony statute' now places an obligation
upon either party for the other party's support when living separate. No
longer is alimony the unilateral obligation of the husband. If it is established by a preponderance of the evidence that the separation was caused
by a party's adultery or desertion, that party is not entitled to alimony.
Moreover, evidence of one party's conduct toward the other party must
be considered by the court in determining whether or not to grant alimony. Thus, the factual cause of the separation must be reviewed by the
court if either party is seeking alimony, regardless of the grounds upon
which the divorce is sought.6
The trial court in Davidson v. Davidson9 provided in its consent order
that the wife was entitled to alimony, with the amount to be determined
later. However, the court also provided that no evidence as to fault would
be offered or admitted. Upon the wife's exception to the latter portion of
the order, the supreme court reversed on the basis of its holding in Bryan
v. Bryan.10 Bryan was found applicable despite the fact that it was decided prior to the elimination of gender in Georgia Code Ann. section 30201.11 Three considerations vis a' vis alimony and conduct, according to
Bryan and Davidson, must be considered:
1. [I]s [A] barred entirely by adultery or desertion?
2. [I]f not, the decision whether to grant [A] alimony should be made
considering the factual cause of the separation and considering [B's] conduct toward [A]; and finally
3. the amount of alimony should be set considering the factual cause of
the separation, the [obligee's] need and the [obligor's] ability to pay. 2
5.
6.
7.

Birch v. Anthony, 109 Ga. 349, 34 S.E. 561 (1899).
244 Ga. at 299, 260 S.E.2d at 20.
GA. CODE ANN. § 30-201 (Supp. 1979).

8. Id.
9. 243 Ga. 848, 257 S.E.2d 269 (1979).
10. 242 Ga. 826, 251 S.E.2d 566 (1979).
11. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-201 (1979).
12. 242 Ga. at 827, 251 S.E.2d at 568.
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The effect of remarriage by one spouse upon that party's right to recover periodic payments or a lump sum alimony award was considered in
Gladney v. Bearden" and Edwards v. Edwards.14 In Gladney, the wife
had remarried after entry of the final judgment and decree of divorce but
before the denial of the husband's motion for new trial. The husband,
relying on Coleman v. Coleman5 and Kristensen v. Kristensen,'6 contended that her remarriage at this time barred her right to recover periodic payments of the lump sum award of alimony as provided for in the
final judgment and decree. The court held that the wife's remarriage at
that time did not bar her right to receive alimony. Coleman and Kristensen were distinguished as pertaining only to remarriage before the entry
of the final judgment and decree, and hence were inapplicable where the
decree had already been entered before the wife's remarriage. A similar
question was presented in Edwards, wherein the wife was awarded as alimony a small portion of a larger tract of land. Since a delay for a survey
of the land was necessary, the divorce decree was not entered until some
fifteen months later. During this period the wife remarried. The supreme
court, in affirming the lower court's ruling that the wife's subsequent remarriage was invalid because the divorce decree had not been signed,
held that the wife was entitled to her alimony.
Whether or not both parties may be allowed to receive alimony is likely
to be the subject of future litigation. In this regard, Reaves v. Reaves 7 is
of particular significance. Previous decisions have been to the effect that
alimony should be awarded to one spouse on the basis of the other
spouse's ability to pay. However, in Reaves the supreme court upheld an
award to the husband of a monetary amount plus the wife's one-half undivided interest in the residence as an equitable division of property."'
Many attorneys are presently including in divorce complaints a prayer for
an equitable division of property in addition to alimony. Furthermore,
many trial courts are now submitting verdict forms to the jury whereby
the jury may deny alimony to either party, but may still equitably divide
the jointly owned property.
Construction of language found in marriage settlement agreements has
become a major source of controversy at the appellate level. Language
designating minor children as beneficiaries under life insurance policies
was the subject faced by the court in Curtis v. Curtis.'9 The agreement
13. 244 Ga. 208, 259 S.E.2d 462 (1979).
14. 244 Ga. 17, 257 S.E.2d 524 (1979).
15. 240 Ga. 417, 240 S.E.2d 870 (1978).
16. 240 Ga. 670, 242 S.E.2d 132 (1978).
17. 244 Ga. 102, 259 S.E.2d 52 (1979).
18. The court expressly stated that this was not alimony. Id. at 103, 259 S.E.2d at 53.
19. 243 Ga. 611, 255 S.E.2d 693 (1979).
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required the father to list the three minor children as beneficiaries on his
group life insurance that he had in effect at the time the agreement was
executed. The problem arose because there was no provision in the agreement requiring the father to obtain equal or equivalent insurance in the
event he changed employers or insurance companies. His employer
changed the group life insurance carrier and the father listed his mother
as the beneficiary on the new policy prior to his death. The court properly
extended the language in the marriage settlement agreement to hold that
when a policy of life insurance replaces the policy or amount specified in
the agreement, the minor's vested interest in the prior policy applies to
the replacement policy.
In Shure v. Shure,"0 the court construed language in an agreement obligating the father to pay for the child's college education when the college
was mutually agreed upon by the child and the father as including expenses incurred by the child at a technical school. The court found the
father liable for the child's expenses incurred in attending a dental assistant school because the father had discussed this choice with the child
and had helped her gain admission. Likewise, in Hancock v. Hancock,2 1 a
liberal construction was applied to a settlement agreement obligating the
father to pay for a child's attendance at a private school. The court construed the language as requiring the father to pay for the child's lunch
and transportation expenses, despite the fact that the wife's attorney's
office typed the agreement in final form. This latter fact was considered
to make no difference because both parties were represented by counsel.
B. Enforcement of the Obligation
While most trial courts use civil contempt as a method of enforcing
compliance, many courts are resorting to the remedy of criminal contempt. The latter remedy was used in Hopkins v. Hopkins,2 2 where the
father was jailed for two successive weekends for his failure to make
timely payments of alimony and child support after having been ordered
to do so. At the time of the contempt hearing the father was current in
his support payments. The supreme court noted that the device of criminal contempt with unconditional imprisonment may be used to preserve
the authority of the trial court and to punish the contemnor for disobedience of its orders. Full payment at the time of the hearing was therefore
not a defense because the trial court was punishing the father for his past
failure to comply with its order.
20. 243 Ga. 695, 256 S.E.2d 375 (1979).
21. 243 Ga. 524, 255 S.E.2d 45 (1979).
22. 244 Ga. 66, 257 S.E.2d 900 (1979).
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In Martin v. Martin,8 the supreme court held that a trial court may

exercise its contempt powers for acts occurring prior to the domestication
of a foreign divorce decree. The court noted that contempt will lie for the
failure to pay an alimony award even though the decree contains no specific command to pay,"' and even though the violation of the foreign decree occurred prior to its domestication in Georgia. 5
C. Modification of the Obligation
During the survey period there was an unusual amount of activity in
the modification area. The two year limitation of Georgia Code Ann. section 30-220(a)"' provided the battleground for several interesting cases. In
Harrisonv. Speidel,17 the former husband had filed a petition for declaratory judgment against his former wife in DeKalb County, and the wife's
counterclaim for modification of child support was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. However, before the counterclaim was dismissed the wife had
filed an original action in Fulton County, the husband's residence. The
husband sought to have the latter action dismissed under the two year
limitation inasmuch as it was filed within two years of the counterclaim
for modification. The supreme court held that the two year limitation did
not apply presumably due to the fact that the dismissal of the counterclaim for lack of jurisdiction related back to the time of filing, so that the
filing of the counterclaim was treated as having never been made.
The two year limitation by its terms does not prohibit the bringing
within two years of a Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
(URESA) 8 revision of a prior URESA revision, since the URESA provisions are outside the applicable code sections, s according to Konscol v.
Konscol. 0 However, the limitation does prohibit a revision petition under
Georgia Code Ann. sections 30-220 to 225.131 within two years of a prior
32
URESA action which had sought the same relief.
33
In Nash v. Nash, the court was asked to determine "whether the original award to the wife of $700.00 per month for eighty-four months was
23. 244 Ga. 68, 257 S.E.2d 903 (1979).
24. See Griggers v. Bryant, 239 Ga. 244, 236 S.E.2d 599 (1977).
25. See Baker v. Baker, 243 Ga. 689, 256 S.E.2d 370 (1979).
26.

"No petition may be filed by either former spouse under this law (GA. CODE ANN.

§§ 30-220 to -225.1 (Supp. 1979)) within a period of two years from the date of the filing of
the previous petition by the same former spouse."
27. 244 Ga. 643, 261 S.E.2d 577 (1979).
28. GA. CODE ANN. ch. 99-9A (Supp. 1980).
29. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 30-220 to -225.1 (Supp. 1979).
30. 150 Ga. App. 696, 258 S.E.2d 326 (1979).
31. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 30-220 to -225.1 (Supp. 1979).
32. Lamb v. Lamb, 241 Ga. 545, 246 S.E.2d 665 (1978).
33. 244 Ga. 749, 262 S.E.2d 64 (1979).

56
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permanent alimony payable periodically and hence subject to revision
under Georgia Code Ann. section 30-220, or was an award from the
corpus of the husband's estate (payable periodically) and hence not subject to such revision."' Justice Hill announced the following formula for
deciding whether a revision is permitted where the decree or alimony trial
transcript does not show to the contrary:
(a) A decree specifying periodic payments for an uncertain time (e.g.,
until death or remarriage) with no indication of gross amount is alimony
and is revisable;
(b) A decree specifying periodic payments for a given time with no indication of gross amount other than by multiplying the amount due by the
number of the payment periods is alimony and is revisable;
(c) A decree specifying periodic payments to be made until a given sum
(i.e., an amount stated) has been paid is division of property or payment
3
of corpus and is not revisable (citations omitted).
0

Since Nash fell within category (b), the original award was revisable
even though the gross amount ($58,800.00) could be readily determined
so as to be the equivalent of a category (c) award. However, the court
found that
the express inclusion of the given sum or gross amount in category (c) is
indicative of the intent of the fact finder, or parties as the case may be,
that the recipient of the award receive the sum stated without termination in the event of remarriage, etc., whereas the contrary intent is indicated when no gross amount is given. 6
The practitioner would be well advised to have the court inquire as to the
intent of the jury before the jury is dispersed if an award by the jury does
not show the gross amount. The court in Nash further held that a group
award ($800.00 per month for all the children) could properly be modified
into a per capita award according to the recipients' needs as an incident
of the alimony modification proceeding.8 7
34. Id. at 749, 262 S.E.2d at 65. Awards from the corpus of the estate are not subject to
revision. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-222 (Supp. 1979).
35. Id. at 750, 262 S.E.2d at 65.
36. Id. at 750-51, 262 S.E.2d at 65-66.
37. Id. at 752, 262 S.E.2d at 66-67. Trial courts as a result of Nash "will have the authority in Code § 30-220 modification proceedings, where a change in financial condition has

been shown, to revise the amount of periodic alimony payments and to change a group
award into a per capita award." Id. at 753, 262 S.E.2d at 67. The trial court may not add in
the modification proceeding a condition that was not part of the original decree. Ausbon v.
Ausbon, 231 Ga. 679, 203 S.E.2d 484 (1974).
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D. Property Division
The supreme court addressed the resulting or implied trust theory in
three significant cases during the survey period. In Ford v. Ford,8 the
issue was whether the grantor must show that a resulting trust was contemplated by way of an agreement between the parties, or whether the
payor-grantor's intent was sufficient, in order to rebut the presumption of
a gift under Georgia Code Ann. section 108-116.3 Relying on Talmadge v.
Talmadge,'0 the husband had contended that the intent of the parties at
the time of the transaction was a jury question, and therefore the trial
court had erred in directing a verdict that the parties' residence, titled in
the wife's name, was a gift to the wife which she held in fee simple. The
husband had testified that the residence was so titled to protect the property from prospective creditors, and that it was his intention to maintain
a joint interest in the property. The court, after distinguishing Talmadge
as a case involving evidence establishing a prior course of dealing between
the parties, followed the test announced in Scales v. Scales41 and Adderholt v. Adderholt4 s that there must be shown an agreement between
the parties to establish a resulting trust. 8
In Woodward v. Woodward,'4 the supreme court noted the conflicts between Georgia Code Ann. section 108-116"5 and Georgia Code Ann. section 53-506. 46 A portion of the proceeds from the sale of a prior, jointly
titled home were used to purchase a condominium, which was titled in
the husband's name. The question presented was whether the trial court's
$3,600.00 award to the wife as "her interest in the condominium" was
appropriate under the implied trust theory. The trial court had apparently found Georgia Code Ann. section 108-116 inapplicable. After exam-

38. 243 Ga. 763, 256 S.E.2d 446 (1979).
39. GA. CODE ANN. § 108-116 (1979) provides:
As between husband and wife, parent and child, and brothers and sisters, payment of purchase money by one, and causing the conveyance to be made to the
other, shall be presumed to be a gift; but a resulting trust in favor of the one
paying the money may be shown and the presumption rebutted.
40. 241 Ga. 609, 247 S.E.2d 61 (1978).
41. 235 Ga. 509, 220 S.E.2d 267 (1975).
42. 240 Ga. 626, 242 S.E.2d 11 (1978).
43. A strong dissent by Hall, J., and Nichols, C.J., correctly argued that the proper inquiry should focus on the payor's intent in establishing a resulting trust. The dissent
pointed out that the majority confuses the requirements for an express trust with those for
a resulting trust. See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TRUSTS

§

443 (1959).

44. 245 Ga. 550, 266 S.E.2d 170 (1980).
45. See note 39 supra.
46. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-506 (1974) provides: "A wife may give property to her husband,
but a gift will not be presumed. The evidence to support it must be clear and unequivocal,
and the intention of the parties must be free from doubt."
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ining the code sections' respective common law origins, the court affirmed
the lower court's ruling because the husband used the wife's one-half interest in the money to take in his own name, rather than placing title in
another's name as would be required under Georgia Code Ann. section
108-116.
In a factual pattern similar to Woodward, the court in Braly v. BralyO'
noted the different standards of proof required under Georgia Code Ann.
section 108-116 and Georgia Code Ann. section 53-506. Under the latter
cited code section, the evidence to support a gift to the husband48 "must
be clear and unequivocal, and the intention of the parties must be free
from doubt,"'49 while the proof necessary to rebut the presumption of a
gift from husband to wife and establish an implied trust is controlled by
5
Adderholt5° and Talmadge. 1
III.

A.

CUSTODY

Parent v. Parent

Under Georgia Code Ann. section 30-12652 a trial judge may modify
visitation rights once in each two year period following the date of the
entry of the judgment without any showing of a change in conditions or
circumstances.5 8 Moreover, a trial court may provide that the custodial
parent has forfeited his right to custody by his subsequent conduct."
Finally, since the enactment of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction
Act, 55 the trial courts have the authority to enforce custody provisions
and to allow recovery of attorney's fees and traveling expenses of the custodial parent."
In Gambrell v. Gambrell,57 the supreme court held that full faith and
credit will not be given to a foreign decree where custody of the child was
47. 244 Ga. 773, 262 S.E.2d 94 (1979).
48. Even through Braly appeared to have been based on the sex of the donor of the
alleged gift, its decision was reaffirmed by the court in Woodward v. Woodward, 245 Ga.
550, 554, 266 S.E.2d 170, 170 (1980).
49. GA. CODE ANN. § 53-506 (1974).
50. Adderholt v. Adderholt, 240 Ga. 626, 242 S.E.2d 11 (1978).
51. Talmadge v. Talmadge, 241 Ga. 609, 247 S.E.2d 61 (1978). See discussion of Ford v.
Ford at text accompanying n. 38 for the applicable standard of proof.
52. GA. CODE ANN. § 30-126 (1979).
53. Stephens v. Stephens, 244 Ga. 467, 260 S.E.2d 864 (1979).
54. For a bizzare factual situation in this regard, see Fortson v. Fortson, 152 Ga. App.
326, 262 S.E.2d 599 (1979).
55. GA. CODE ANN. ch. 74-5 (Supp. 1980).
56. GA. CODE ANN. § 74-516(b) (Supp. 1980); Harvey v. Harvey, 244 Ga. 199, 259 S.E.2d
456 (1979).
57. 244 Ga. 178, 259 S.E.2d 439 (1979).
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awarded without the child's presence in the foreign state and service was
made by publication. The foreig-n state had awarded custody to the
mother, although the child was not present there. In the mother's habeas
corpus action in Georgia, the trial court granted the father's counterclaim
for custody. Because the mother was not the child's legal custodian, the
rule requiring that suits for change of custody be litigated in the custodial
parent's domicile" did not apply, and the habeas court therefore had authority to entertain the father's counterclaim for custody.
B. Parent v. Third Party
In many cases the custodial parent may by written contract or oral
agreement grant temporary custody of a minor child to a third party, who
most often are grandparents. After surrendering temporary custody, conflicts usually arise and the courts are called upon to determine whether or
not the agreement is enforceable. In Harbin v. Sandlin,59 the supreme
court ruled that in order to find the custodial parent to have relinquished
all of her parental rights, the agreement must be certain and definite.
Moreover, the court of appeals has recently held that the issue of child
custody may be reopened as a "change in circumstance" where the custodial parent has voluntarily relinquished custody to a third party for a
period of three years. °
In Salim v. Salim,61 a highly publicized case, the mother had obtained
a temporary order (presumably entered ex parte) which enjoined the husband from removing the parties' minor child beyond the court's jurisdiction. On the same day that the order was signed, the husband took the
child to his relatives in Pakistan. Thereafter, the wife's petition for
habeas corpus along with the temporary hearing resulted in an order confining the husband to jail until the child was returned to the wife. The
supreme court noted that venue in habeas corpus actions under Georgia
Code Ann. section 50-1036s is proper in "the circuit where the illegal detention exists," 3 which has been construed to mean the circuit where
control over the child is exercised." The court held that since the husband "exercised ultimate control over the child by virtue of the agency of
the family in Pakistan, venue was proper in" the county where he lived."
58. See Matthews v. Matthews, 238 Ga. 201, 232 S.E.2d 76 (1977).
59. 243 Ga. 677, 256 S.E.2d 360 (1979).
60. Thompson v. Thompson, 153 Ga. App. 80, 264 S.E.2d 558 (1980).
61. 244 Ga. 513, 260 S.E.2d 894 (1979).
62. GA. CODE ANN. § 50-103 (1979).
63. 244 Ga. at 514, 260 S.E.2d at 896, quoting GA. CoDE ANN. § 50-103 (1979).
64. See Fielder v. Sadla, 193 Ga. 268, 18 S.E.2d 486 (1942).
65. 244 Ga. at 514, 260 S.E.2d at 896. The trial court was also authorized to incarcerate
the husband until the child was returned to the wife, pursuant to GA. CODE ANN. § 50-115
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C. Enforcement of Custody Awards
Appellate courts have continued to uphold a trial court's enforcement
of custody awards." In Andrews v. Cromer,6 7 the wife had held the child
beyond her visitation period and had failed to return the child. The
supreme court, relying on Fields v. Fields,6s affirmed the trial court's decision holding the wife in criminal contempt of court for retaining the
child beyond the visitation period.
IV.

ADOPTION

Department of Human Resources v. Ledbetter," dealt with interim
custody after termination of the father's parental rights. After the
mother's death, the three minor children were "virtually adopted" by her
aunt and uncle, who acted as "grandparents." When the father sought
voluntarily to release his parental rights to the Department of Human
Resources, the "grandparents" sought to intervene and have the children
placed in their permanent custody. The trial court construed the phrase
"other suitable measures for the care and welfare of the child" in Georgia
Code Ann. section 24A-3204(a) 70 as giving the court power to place the
children directly with an adopting family, and effectually allowed the
"grandparents" the right to intervene. However, the trial court did not
rule finally to terminate the father's parental rights or to allow adoption
by the "grandparents." The court of appeals in reversing the trial court
concluded that the "court should seek to place custody first with the Department of Human Resources, then with a licensed child-placing agency,
then in a foster home, and lastly in some other undesignated receiver." 71
The court noted that if the trial court's order were taken literally, the
latter would be making itself, rather than the Department of Family and
Children Services, the adoption-placing authority, which is contrary to
(1979).
66. See cases cited in McGough and McGough, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: Domestic Relations, 30 MERCER L. Rav. 59, 71 (1978).
67. 243 Ga. 472, 255 S.E.2d 18 (1979).
68. 240 Ga. 173, 240 S.E.2d 58 (1977).
69. 153 Ga. App. 416, 265 S.E.2d 337 (1980).
70. GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-3204(a) (1976). This code section provides in pertinent part:
(a) If, upon entering an order terminating the parental rights of a parent, there
is no parent having parental rights, the court shall commit the child to the custody of the Division of Children and Youth or a licensed child-placing agency,
willing to accept custody for the purpose of placing the child for adoption, or in
the absence thereof in a foster home or take other suitable measures for the care
and welfare of the child....
(emphasis supplied).
71. 153 Ga. App. at 418, 265 S.E.2d at 339.
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V.

LEGISLATION

Effective April 1, 1980, Georgia Code Ann. Chapter 74-378 provides for
the determination of paternity. Jurisdiction is vested concurrently in the
state and superior courts in all proceedings for the determination of paternity of a child who is a resident of this state,7' 4 and proceedings may be
held in closed courts in the interest of confidentiality.7 6 The child must be
made a party to the action and must be represented by a guardian ad
litem. 76 Of significance is the fact that the court may order the parties to
submit to blood tests, including human leucocyte antigen (HLA) testing,
and this order is enforceable by contempt. 7 Medical test results are admissible in the same manner as other expert testimony.7 Finally, the
court's decree on the paternity issue may in addition include an order for
support payments and may specify visitation privileges, 79 which may be
enforced or modified as in divorce proceedings.8 0

GA. CODE ANN.

GA.
GA.
GA.
GA.
GA.
GA.
GA.

CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE
CODE

§§ 99-211 to -214 (1976).

ch. 74-3 (Supp. 1980).
§ 74-301 (Supp. 1980).
§ 74-314 (Supp. 1980).
§ 74-305(a) (Supp. 1980).
§ 74-306 (Supp. 1980).
§ 74-307 (Supp. 1980).
§ 74-312 (Supp. 1980).
GA. CODE ANN. § 74-313(b) (Supp. 1980).
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.
ANN.

